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‘Crimes committed by small, mobile shock-groups, consisting of hooli-
gans, should not be confused with morally based civil disobedient acts.’  
– Jürgen Habermas (in Falcón y Tella, 2004: 88) 
 
‘[A] terrifying, sublime image of violence is still merely an image. An 
image of terror is also produced, staged – and can be aesthetically ana-
lyzed and criticized in terms of a critique of representation. This kind of 
criticism does not indicate any lack of moral sense. The moral sense 
comes in where it relates to the individual, empirical event that is doc-
umented by a certain image. But the moment an image begins to circu-
late in the media and acquires the symbolic value of a representation of 
the political sublime, it can be subjected to art criticism along with every 
other image.’   
– Boris Groys (2008: 127) 
 
Introduction: Militant Training Camp 
What is the relationship between art and civil disobedience? This question 
has, in recent years, become increasingly pertinent, not only for social 
justice movements and protest groups who have employed the creative 
methods of artists in their campaigns, but also in the sense that social un-
rest – whether artistically involved or not – is an engagement in the dy-
namics of ‘cultural production’, and, as such, aesthetics therefore can and 
should be a medium through which civil disobedience is understood.  
In March 2012, the Arcadia Missa Gallery in London hosted Militant 
Training Camp, (Bresolin, 2012) a social experimental performance camp 
designed to explore the idea of non-pacifist activity within wider social 
movements. Engaging not only with the tradition of anarchist activism, 
but also with more recent artistic involvement in acts of civil disobedi-
ence, the week-long performance-piece camp involved a residential as-
cetic ‘training programme’ followed by a series of violent performances 
open to the public. These took place in varied locations, from the gallery 
itself to other sites of protest, such as Occupy sites and Anarchist theatres. 
The project claimed to directly engage with both the successes and failings 
of militant art groups like King Mob, Black Mask, and Voina. Through 
physical and mental exercise, the camp promised to empower the group 
of artist-volunteers to be active and resistant to, in the words of the call 
for participants, the ‘last desperate acts of capitalism.’ In many senses, 
Militant Training Camp’s lofty aims – to understand the mind of the mili-
tant dissident – fell short. While at first appearing to be true to the claims 
of its own title – the participants slept and ate in the gallery space, em-
barked on rigorous exercise routines and plotted insurrectionary activities 
– a sceptic could accuse it of merely parading as ‘direct’ militant activism, 
of being a false representation of what we know to be direct action. As a 
‘symbolic’ re-enactment, somewhere between Occupy protest and terror-
ist cell, the project was always going to be fundamentally mimetic, if not 
actually risking parody. This was combined, however, with visceral per-
formances of genuinely violent acts and rehearsals of militant activity, 
which pressed the question: can art not contribute something distinctive 
to the act of protest? Was the ‘militancy’ of the project weakened by its 
mimetic qualities, or does this aesthetic condition offer an alternative in-
sight into the structure of civil disobedience? 
The underlying concern of any question regarding the aesthetics of civil 
disobedience is from where are we asking the question – socially or artisti-
cally? To this end, it would be fairly straightforward to criticise projects 
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such as Militant Training Camp for not being ‘proper’ social activism. 
However, in this paper we would argue, first, that any line between the 
political effect of civil disobedience and its aesthetic qualities are today in-
creasingly blurred, a blurring documented by the rise of participatory, 
relational and socially engaged forms of ‘art activism’;1 and, as such, the 
typical subordination of aesthetic practice to ‘real’ protest risks obscuring 
the complexities of disobedience as a cultural force. Nevertheless, when 
writers on art activism emphasise performance and resist the commodity-
form of ‘gallery art’, they express scepticism at artists’ claims to subversion 
and revolt which are not situated within agonistic contexts of real con-
frontation. Our second argument examines this idea in terms of Peter 
Sloterdijk’s concept of ‘rage banks’, and suggests ways in which gallery 
space and aesthetics can yet be instructive elements of contemporary civil 
disobedience. 
 
Two Aspects in the Rise of ‘Art Activism’ 
It has by now been well documented that the idea of ‘art activism’ has em-
erged with a renewed intensity in recent times (see, for example, (Bishop, 
2006; Firat & Kuryel, 2011b; Grindon, 2010; Sholette, 2002). But, given that 
the relationship between art and politics has a long history, why this re-
invigoration of art’s social conscience now? While a full answer to this 
question is well beyond the reaches of this paper, there are two compo-
nents of particular note which are worth examining. 
One of the obvious responses to the question of ‘why now?’ is to point to 
the increasing capabilities of, and spaces for, artistic or aesthetic produc-
tion, coupled with the growing reconfiguring of the more traditional rela-
tionship between ‘artist’ and ‘viewer’ to performance-based collective pro-
cesses, rooted in context-specific events (see Bishop, 2006)). Undoubtedly, 
increased media outlets and networked technologies have increased the 
possibilities for ‘expressing dissent’ via artistic means;2 allowing, for exam-
ple, high-profile acts of playful subversion by groups such as The Yes Men3 
and the Laboratory of Insurrectionary Imagination;4 or the instant circu-
lation of activities by groups such as Act Up.5 Correspondingly, spaces for 
informed theoretical discussion of the inherent possibilities of artistic 
practice to act as a catalyst for social intervention continue to emerge: 
whether in publications such as The Journal of Aesthetics and Protest, 
which has been published since 2001; physical spaces for discussion and 
production such as ABC No Rio;6 or more institutional centres such as the 
Leonore Annenberg Prize for Art and Social Change,7 inaugurated in 2009, 
or educational programmes such as the Provisions Learning Project, a re-
search centre opened in 2011 for ‘arts and social change’8 based in George 
Mason University’s School of Art, Washington.9 As Gregory Sholette 
comments, in his study of the protest art collective Las Agencias: 
‘Certainly in the 1980s public protest was often infused with artistic ele-
ments yet this never reached the degree of saturation witnessed in recent 
mass demonstrations. High and low, pre and post modern now mingle as 
conspicuous, papier-maché puppets and digitally produced agit-prop im-
agery share a public stage that is as discontinuous as the movement itself 
appears to be.’ (Sholette, 2003) 
Naturally, the form that this ‘art activism’ takes is varied. We have, to be 
sure, come a long way (both politically and aesthetically) since Bakunin 
called for the rather literal interaction of art and politics, by taking paint-
ings from the National Museum to be hung on the barricades of the 1849 
Dresden insurgency. But in keeping with the tradition of ‘de-skilled’ prac-
tice which, as Ian Burn argued (Burn, 1999), characterised artists attempt-
ing to reject the commodification and pretensions of ‘high art’, recent 
subversive and absurdist collectives such as the Luther Blissett Project10 of 
the late 1990s, or Guerrilla Communication of today, continue to channel 
the spirit of the twentieth century avant-garde – Dada, the Situationist 
International and so on – but with ready-to-hand access to a wealth of 
network communications which seem to bypass the traditional need for a 
gallery or curated exhibition to exist as ‘art’. Likewise, organised protest 
events have utilised aesthetic features in order to attempt to subvert and 
undermine their regulation by the civil authorities, such as the Bike Bloc 
protest carried out in Copenhagen Climate Summit in 2009 (see, for ex-
ample, Sniderman 2009). Today, as Gavin Grindon summarises, art activ-
ism ranges ‘from ideologically critical practices within institutional art 
forms, to community-oriented art projects, to playful street art, to extra-
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institutional practices of invisible theatre and tactical media within social 
movements.’ (2010: 11) Nowhere are these variable approaches – along 
with the tensions that accompany them – more apparent than in the 2012 
Berlin Biennale, entitled ‘Forget Fear’.11 Curated by Artur Zmijewski, with 
associate curators including the Russian anarcho-absurdist group Voina, 
the exhibition aimed to investigate the question of how contemporary art 
responds to political insurgency, and what its role might be in civil pro-
test. The result was an invitation for Occupy protestors and other non-
artist activist groups to share the gallery space – along with performance 
artists, participatory projects and video installation – to not only curate 
artistic interventions, but also to present ‘activism’ itself as a heterogen-
eous, yet identifiable, form. 
The largely critical reaction to the Berlin Biennale is significant: for the 
result was in many senses a broader echo of the debate surrounding art’s 
role in the political sphere. Above all, the exhibition was seen as noble, but 
confused, at times awkward, at times simply cacophonous.12 There are, to 
be sure, reasons for wariness at the sheer polyvocality of art’s ‘social prac-
tice’ (see Bishop, 2006). However, it might also be suggested that such vari-
ation is not simply the result of a complex and often tenuous history of 
engagement between art and politics – it is also rooted in the very energy 
which drives contemporary protest itself.  
Indeed, if we are to see such art activism as distinctly ‘contemporary’, we 
can also suggest a second component of its emergence at this point in 
time. The impetus for such experimentation with civil protest must also 
be seen as connected to what might be termed a lingering post-ideological 
malaise: a situation described by Sloterdijk as arising from ‘the loss of the 
function of symbolic institutions responsible for the political accumula-
tion and transformation of dissident energies during two centuries of con-
flict’ (2010: 190); a frustrated and deeply ambiguous energy capable of both 
creativity and nihilism, dissatisfied with traditional forms of political ex-
pression.13 If the distinctiveness of this malaise is its lack of overarching 
political identity, the likes of Alain Badiou (2012), Slavoj Žižek (2012) and 
David Harvey (2012) are, nevertheless, currently making claims that the 
‘accumulations of rage’ seen in events such as the London riots are frag-
mented signs of a utopian future.14 Such thinkers argue that, while dispa-
rate, these activities from across the spectrum of violent activity can be 
read as symptomatic of a ‘global struggle’; a struggle which incorporates, 
for Harvey, the protestors of Tahrir Square, the students of Chile, the 
workers striking in Greece and ‘the militant opposition emerging all 
around the world, from London to Durban, Buenos Aires, Shenzhen, and 
Mumbai.’ He concludes: ‘the brutal dominions of big capital and sheer 
money power are everywhere on the defensive’ (2012: 164). 
It is not surprising, then, that in conjunction with such enthusiasm for 
the collective organisation and mobilization of ‘street activity’, via the 
dazzling array of available network technologies, a question is prompted 
which would seem to unite the aesthetic and the political concerns of art 
activism. Gregory Sholette thus inquires: ‘does this counter-globalization 
imagination indicate that a new variation of left, cultural politics has em-
erged?’ (2003). And such a question remains, for both theorists and activ-
ists alike, certainly seductive, difficult though it is not to see an idea (or, 
perhaps more accurately, a series of images) arising from protests such as 
the Wall Street Occupation, which suggests a re-imagined space for cul-
tural politics emerging, whether through documentary photographs 
(usually guided by motifs of collectivism, or juxtapositions between peace-
ful resistance and heavy-handed state authority), satirical slogans on pro-
test boards, or the seemingly endless range of text-over-image ‘memes’ 
circulated in social media.15 
 
Effective Interventions: Art and Subversion 
But perhaps the seduction of Sholette’s question – and the apparent de-
sire to answer affirmatively (contra Sholette himself) – can take us too far, 
too quickly. This risks ignoring two specific tensions within the idea of ‘art 
activism’, both inherently related to these twin aspects of the rise of art 
activism, and both illustrated by the Militant Training Camp project.  
First, we must be aware that any response to Sholette’s question would be 
primarily a rhetorical activity – if not a curating activity, not unlike Zmi-
jewski’s Biennale – involving the arrangement of visual and documentary 
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evidence to form a promise of emancipatory politics; an activity which 
would always simultaneously be involved in defending its arrangements 
of symbols, motifs and imaginary from a less accommodating mainstream 
media suspicious of the ‘novelty’ of such a movement.16 This is really to 
say, in asking questions of the effects (or effectiveness) of artistic civil diso-
bedience, we seem to be involved in an aesthetic question – possibly as 
much as we are a social one. Second, if these two components of art activ-
ism – the expansion of artistic production, and the simmering energy of 
post-ideological dissatisfaction – answer the question of ‘why now?’ it is 
important to see that these are not without friction. After all, the opti-
mism with which collectivism, participation and protest are documented 
(from within protest movements, at least17) sits uneasily with the deeply 
ambiguous frustrations so often expressed as violent rage. And, just as the 
curators of the Berlin Biennale found, speaking of art in the moment of 
such rage can easily lead to charges of intellectual navel-gazing of the 
worst kind.18  
It is in this sense that projects such as Militant Training Camp, far from an 
indication of some renewed ideological conscience, may well suggest a 
more anti-ideological, self-destructive and mildly narcissistic malaise in 
terms of the concepts and methods of political expression; less 99%,19 more 
Fight Club. Channelling the rage and frustration of non-ideological diso-
bedience – in particular the August riots in London, 2011, images of which 
were used in several performances – the project attempted to confront 
their audience with forms of actual violence itself. For example, in ‘Propa-
ganda of the Deed’, which took place on international women’s day, lead 
artist Tom Bresolin repeatedly punched Gallery director Rozsa Farkas in 
the face, for five minutes. In ‘Dog’ Bresolin was stripped to the waist, tied 
to a chair, the sides of his head were shaved, and electrodes were attached 
to his head, arms, and chest while prison blues music wailed woefully in 
the background. He was then electrocuted for thirty minutes while a mix 
of images, news footage and movie-clips were projected onto his body. 
The projection featured a strange mix of politics, violence and consumer-
ism: flitting from a policeman beating a protestor to an adorable puppy. 
The ‘reality’ of such violence was, of course, questionable. The project 
remained heavily based on re-enactment, and most of the activities took 
place within the gallery, or at least, within the gallery system: audiences 
gathered, we presume, to witness performances and/or videos of perform-
ances, as art. As Gavin Grindon notes, art that substantively or formally 
challenges social hegemony often operates in a different, often subtle, 
context when compared to ‘activism’ per se. The reason is, of course, that 
the boundaries which identity ‘art’ from ‘non-art’ are, while rarely tan-
gible or visible, certainly embedded in certain institutional frameworks. 
‘One can,’ Grindon rightly points out, ‘be as subversive and questioning of 
social relations as one wishes in a gallery’ (2010: 11). While the language of 
struggle, subversion and critique has become a staple of artistic discourse 
throughout the last two centuries, this does not necessary equate to an 
effective form of disobedience: describing one’s work as ‘subversive’ is not 
solely reserved for ideological calls-to-arms, it also tends to look rather 
good on institutional grant proposals. If art activism often only mimics 
‘real’ social activism, as Grindon argues, then it remains within the boun-
daries of the gallery system with no real consequences. There is, it seems, a 
need for a confrontation: an event of disobedience, which renders the act 
political rather than merely aesthetic. In a similar vein, Firat and Kuryel 
note that while much cultural activism tends to exhibit an ironic and 
humorous character, this sense of subversive ‘Bakhtinian carnival’ (the 
form of protest, incidentally, which Grindon promotes) can, both histori-
cally and theoretically, give way to ‘a contained and predictable parade 
fascinated by its own creativity,’ particularly when such activism ‘is not 
concerned with generating site and context specific situations sustaining a 
continuous political engagement’ (2011a: 13). Likewise, for Claire Bishop 
(2012), while art has an obligation to respond to society’s ills, effective art 
must be aimed at ‘activating’ its audience. It must antagonise, provoke, 
and challenge the passivity of spectator consumption. As such, Bishop 
rails against mere ‘spectating’ or contemplative artistic practice.  
There is, undoubtedly, a general risk in any celebration of artistic subver-
sion becoming so far immersed in seductive claims to ‘expose’ and ‘reveal’ 
implicit cultural relations, its effectiveness becomes all but impossible to 
gauge. That is to say, sure enough, when Firat and Kuryel duly go on to 
argue that there is a need for ‘tactical confrontation’ in order to create 
effective activist work, we find ourselves in the curiously predictable dis-
course which privileges context, cultural awareness, tactical confronta-
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tion and so on; terms that are, by now, commonplace within critical dis-
cussions of activism as seemingly unquestioningly superior to the more 
traditional aesthetic activities of contemplation and spectatorship. Again, 
however, we must be careful of the haste with which such activities are 
dismissed. An over-reliance on, and reduction to, such motifs can easily 
conceal the complex ways in which a ‘confrontation’ might be con-
structed, encountered and revisited. Salient though Grindon’s argument 
is – and echoed as it is by Firat and Kuryel, Bishop, Lucy Lippard (1997) 
before them, and so on – that art is effective only through a confronta-
tional or agonistic event, it is also important to resist the converse and 
overly-simple move whereby artistic practice is subordinate to ‘real’ activ-
ism. This would be to presume, too hastily, that art and politics are inher-
ently separable, and as such artistic protest is only effective when it is im-
mediate and visceral, but also directed to some purpose within the 
political sphere; for as Bishop notes, when the performance of art activism 
is unattached to a lobby, it can quickly become merely symbolic (2004). 
However, it must not be forgotten that a converse condition of the inter-
est in art’s relationship to politics is the extent to which politics has itself 
embraced – if not overrun – the aesthetic. Indeed, as Boris Groys has ar-
gued, if there is a lack of effective political dissidence within contemporary 
art, this is not down to the ineffectiveness of the artist, but the far more 
effective intrusion into the aesthetic by the political (2008). 
 
The Curating of the Political 
For Groys, it is not simply the case that where art becomes subject to the 
rationality of political struggle, it loses its radical potential to liberate; as 
such, as Marcuse once argued, art cannot represent revolution, but only 
‘invoke it in another medium’ (Marcuse, 1972: 104). Rather, Groys argues 
that the presumption that there is a clear disciplinary demarcation be-
tween the realm of politics (and its instrumental reason) and art (with its 
unlimited imagination) is at fault. For Marcuse, the problem for art to 
overcome when it engages with politics was one of identity: art must de-
fend itself as art and not become subservient to other forces. Art is a me-
dium to be safeguarded within the political sphere; its effectiveness de-
pends on maintaining its autonomy in the face of that which would ex-
ploit it. This, of course, gives rise to the paradox of socially engaged art: 
the condition of the artist’s autonomy has always, since Plato, been their 
separation from the social; their lack of ‘usefulness’; their capacity for sus-
tained, but disconnected, reflection (Sholette, 2002). But more import-
antly for Groys, this also misses the distinctly modern problem of identity 
that the artist faces.20 It is not the case that art must find creative ways to 
enter into political debate. After all, from the nineteenth century on-
wards, Groys argues, art has entered the political sphere in many shapes 
and forms. However: 
‘The problem is not art’s incapacity to become truly political. The prob-
lem is that today’s political sphere has already become aestheticized. 
When art becomes political, it is forced to make the unpleasant discovery 
that politics has already become art – that politics has already situated it-
self in the aesthetic field.’ (Groys, 2009) 
As such, the political question of civil disobedience is necessarily an aes-
thetic one. Art activism is not something created in the safety of a white 
cube gallery and then ‘entered into’ the political domain. Rather, it is al-
ready embroiled within an aesthetic domain that has been ceded to the 
political. The space of ‘confrontation’ between the activist and the social 
reality they seek to change is one already organised and presented accord-
ing to certain aesthetic guidelines. As de Certeau commented of civil dis-
ruption in The Practice of Everyday Life, ‘European anti-nuclear demon-
strations, German or Italian terrorism, ghetto riots, Khomeini, Carter, 
etc.: these fragments of history are organised into articles of doctrine’ 
(1984: 186). Once narrated as symbolic of wider movements, the world is 
drawn into a particular structure of representation. ‘What can you oppose 
to the facts? You can only give in, and obey what they “signify”...’ (de 
Certeau, 1984: 186).21 But whereas de Certeau’s narrative analysis points to 
the need for coherence and the stabilising of signifiers (which, in itself, 
would open up the possibilities for deconstructive subversion), for Groys 
the legacy of the avant-garde and its assault on univocal meaning is not 
‘other’ to late modern media representation, but inherent to it.22  Twenty-
first century media representation and circulation has far exceeded that of 
the Dadaists in terms of its accomplished dexterity at juxtaposition, mon-
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tage, and presenting the ‘shock of the new’. There is no better example, 
for Groys, than the representation of ‘terror’ itself, which constitutes an 
‘image-production machine’ (2008: 126): the terrorist, Groys argues, con-
sciously and artistically stages events that produce their own easily recog-
nisable aesthetics, with no need of an artist to represent them in medi-
ation. Osama Bin Laden, Groys argues, can be seen as a video artist (2008: 
122). Conversely, images of the defeated terrorist – humiliated prisoners 
from Guantanamo or Abu-Ghraib – also bypass the need for an artist, 
whilst retaining iconographic similarities to the art and film of Viennese 
Actionism and Pasolini which should not be ignored. 
Therefore, while Grindon is concerned that such art is merely re-
presenting versions of more extreme, real life politics but within the con-
straints of the gallery system, Groys suggests that the ‘point is not that art 
should conquer the territory of politics, should be committed etc. Instead, 
it needs to find its way in the territory that is now being conquered mas-
sively by political and also economic forces’ (Abdullah, Benzer, & Groys, 
2011: 86). The necessity for art to ‘find its way’ in civil protest, and thus 
maintain an effectiveness which is distinctive to aesthetic practice, in-
volves re-assessing how the event of disobedience relates to the institu-
tional gallery space. Whereas this move may seem counter-intuitive 
(given the seemingly inherent rejection of galleries as forms of art activ-
ism), Groys suggests that once we understand the political sphere as ‘out-
arting’ the artists, there arises an opportunity to assess aspects of art prac-
tice; in short, what moves art, as art, to beyond the more immanent de-
mands of what Matthew Fuller terms the ‘media ecology’:23 
‘In contrast to the mass media, art institutions are places of historical 
comparison between the past and present, between the original promise 
and the contemporary realisation of this promise and, thus, they possess 
the means and ability to be sites of critical discourse – because every such 
discourse needs a comparison, needs a framework and a technique of 
comparison.’ (2008: 129) 
As such, the mobilisation of terror which usurps ‘subversive’ art – be it a 
suicide bomber’s video, or a media report on the rioting of ‘feral youths’ – 
holds one key aesthetic difference. Terrorist or antiterrorist, Groys says, 
the non-art production of images and icons is geared towards the produc-
tion of a truth beyond any criticism of representation. In short: the politi-
cal usurpation of art is iconophilic, whereas the artist, and their surround-
ing gallery space (whether institutional or improvised) remains 
fundamentally iconoclastic (2008, pp. 124-126).  
The reach of this iconoclasm would include, perhaps, a particular decon-
struction of the ‘event’ of protest itself. If the violence of Militant Training 
Camp was contrived to an extent, its audience also witnessed the per-
formances inside the camp itself, in situ. Participants had been stripped of 
their personal belongings and clothes on arrival; contact with the outside 
world was strictly regulated and limited; their time strictly controlled 
(both to avoid boredom and to maximise the effects of the camp through 
a militarised regime); and through very basic rations, daily exercise (often 
in the driving rain), and simple sleeping conditions, in order for there to 
be an ‘actual experience’ of militancy. But as the week went on – perhaps 
unintentionally – the nature of this experience became increasingly am-
biguous. While spectators viewed not just the artistic performances, but 
also where and how the group were eating and sleeping, the violence of 
the deeds intermingled with a voyeuristic aesthetic. Both of these im-
mediate relations between artist and audience seemed to trespass, albeit 
from different sides, on the boundaries of a ‘real’ event of violence. To this 
extent, the discomfort of the audience in witnessing a girl being punched 
in the face, or a young artist being electrocuted, that forms part of the 
work, may, of course, constitute an ‘event’ from the shared experience 
between the performers and spectators that could attempt to compete 
with acts of civil protest. It prompted reaction, and ‘opened debate’ (a 
ground which much militant art justifies its violence on). But if this was, 
indeed, the ‘event’ of protest, then it was clearly undirected; it lacked any 
criteria for civil disobedience, in the conventional sense, and would seem 
to be closer to the history of self-harming art (for example, the work of 
Chris Burden: a genre notably devoid of political overtones). However, 
the question which Groys’ reappraisal of gallery spaces raises is whether 
such experience necessarily constitutes the ‘event’ by itself, in an artistic 
sense. It would seem, rather, that the curatorial placing of such an event 
was part of a wider constitution of ‘protest’; one which involved not sim-
ply a synchronic moment of confrontation or performance, but also a 
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more laborious and repetitive diachronic arrangement of images and ac-
tions of ‘rage’, connecting the work not just to its militant forebears, but 
also to an image-saturated media context, competing to frame the ico-
nography of ‘activism’. 
In this sense, if the repetition of the camp not only robbed the event of 
confrontation (whether by exposing its mimetic basis, or more literally 
reducing the severity of the violence24), it also reconstituted the event in a 
way that asked whether civil disobedience is not itself a mimetic, aesthetic 
event: a rehearsal which is re-rehearsed in media circulation and political 
discussion? This point of re-presentation is precisely where – as Groys in-
dicates in the quote our paper began with – aesthetic criticism becomes 
once again applicable. Given its organiser’s commitment to anarchist mili-
tancy, this curatorial point was perhaps not always clear in Militant Train-
ing Camp itself, and as such easily falls prey to the criticism of mimetic 
parody. In contrast, Alexis Milne’s ‘Riot (2008)’, a film and performance 
piece at the Danielle Arnaud Gallery (a converted Georgian house in a 
residential area of Kennington, London), illustrated this ‘stretching out’ of 
the event. Made in response to the G20 demonstrations, it involved the 
artist (who was a participant in the Militant Training Camp) and an ac-
complice hurling chairs and other items at a further projection of actual 
riot footage. In many senses, the ‘performance’ of the piece, in terms of 
the contemporaneous event, was not the violence itself, but the juxtapos-
ition of violent images with the otherwise sedate setting of the gallery it-
self. One might also think of art which is often disassociated from (or am-
biguously related to) a wider social movement ‘proper’, but nevertheless 
takes protest as its subject matter. For example, Anna Eriksson’s observa-
tional video installation The Last Tenants (2011), a four-screen looped 
narrative of tenants refusing to leave a Berlin apartment block; or Rabih 
Mroúe’s The Pixelated Revolution (2012), where the artist delivered a lec-
ture on ‘proper’ activist film-making processes (as outlined by avant-garde 
film-makers Dogme 95), correcting amateur footage of protests in Syria 
for its failure to conform to such rules; or even Walid Raad’s on-going 
exhibition project Scratching on Things I Could Disavow (2012).25 In these 
works, the representation of acts of protest is certainly institutional rather 
than ‘tactical’ or ‘real’, and as such, is rendered ‘art’ rather than protest. 
But in doing so – in drawing attention to the institutionalisation of the 
act, through the boundaries drawn around it, the collage of medias em-
ployed and the juxtaposition of action and space – the formation of the 
work as an exhibition itself is also put on view: forming a confrontation 
between the audience and the curatorial conditions of the more explicit 
‘confrontation’ of the performance itself. 
 
Sloterdijk’s Banks of Rage 
There must be a caveat to Groys’ argument, however. We suggested pre-
viously that two aspects of art activism were the expansion of artistic pro-
duction, and the frustrated energy of post-ideological malaise. We have 
argued that the first aspect can be misinterpreted to wrongfully situate 
the place of the artist in the event of civil disobedience, at the risk of leav-
ing the artist redundant. But to simply revert to the art gallery as a site of 
exposition and understanding can easily risk simply stepping back into the 
safety of the white cube. Clearly, there needs to be more of a case for what 
specific role the gallery plays that an instantaneous media sphere cannot 
already fulfil; and to begin to identify this, we need to turn to the second 
aspect of art activism: the field of rage within which contemporary protest 
flourishes.  
An effective aesthetics of civil disobedience in many senses seems to sit in 
between two extremes: on the one hand, artistic intellectualism that, as 
Grindon argues, robs protest of effectiveness, and on the other hand, the 
kind of senseless violence or mockery which Habermas famously dismisses 
as illegitimate crime rather than civil protest. In Grindon’s view, it would 
seem that the potential to transform such energy into constructive social 
change seems to constitute a firm line of division between legitimate and 
illegitimate projects: Bike Bloc’s communal and creative approach to pro-
test is legitimate; Voina’s setting fire to a police van and declaring it ‘art’ 
illegitimate.26 However, this distinction seems only to defer the question 
of the grounds for such legitimacy, rather than address the specifically 
aesthetic dimension of protest we have discussed so far.  
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Such deferral is, again, in danger of moving too quickly, carried by the 
inherent optimism any such claim to legitimacy necessarily holds (the 
optimism that there is a clear line between legitimate and illegitimate pro-
test, and that certain forms of collective activism occupy the former). But, 
as such, this kind of optimism is a form of investment: a point that Sloter-
dijk has elaborated upon in his book Rage and Time. For Sloterdijk, the 
transformative energy of protest (which he links to the broader historical 
concept of rage) is at risk of misrepresentation. Rage is too often treated as 
instrumental (or damaging, or pathological, etc.) to its users, which is to 
skip over (or purposefully defer from) the phenomenon of violence itself. 
If Groys interprets the ‘artistic process’ aspect of art activism as something 
which, often unknowingly, cedes its territory to a political sphere that has 
no need of an artist, Sloterdijk examines the corresponding aspect of ‘rage’ 
as something which has been domesticated, deferred and often misrepre-
sented. Rage, he argues, must rather be understood as a form of capital: 
something which is spent (in acts of vengeful violence) or invested; and 
the treatment of such investment brings attention to the complex ways in 
which notions of ‘legitimate’ rage are assembled. As such, Sloterdijk 
claims, ‘the violence of the twentieth century did not “erupt” at any point 
in time.’ Rather, what at first ‘appeared like the highest level of running 
amok in reality consisted of bureaucracy, party organisation, routine, and 
the effects of organisational reflection’ (2010: 26). 
It is tempting to argue, of course (alongside Badiou, Harvey et al.), that 
such an appraisal is rendered obsolete by the events of 2011, where ‘spon-
taneous’ protest seemed to resist such top-down organisation. But Sloter-
dijk’s thesis suggests that one cannot understand these protests, let alone 
make optimistic predictions as to their symbolism, without theorising 
rage as an investment, and, more boldly, as a condition of historical 
change itself.27 The most basic form of rage, Sloterdijk argues, is an exer-
tion of pride, something the Ancient Greeks, and their idea of thymos, 
knew very well. But the history of Western culture beyond Athens is one 
of suppressing this thymotic instinct, not denying it, but rather storing or 
investing it in order to gain ‘interest’ until it is finally acted upon. For the 
most part such individual rage ‘projects’ – angry mobs, militant individu-
als, or even anarchist calls for violent protest – fail. But if individual, local 
rage projects are collected, centralised and stored, under the guidance of a 
‘single administration’ – a Church, a party, an ideology – then they can 
form ‘rage banks’ (Sloterdijk, 2010: 62). Thus, a future world is promised 
through the eventual release of rage in collective form – revolution – and 
the destruction it brings. This, Sloterdijk argues, is a basic structure of 
meaning in life: ‘rage projects’ gear life towards the fulfilment of ven-
geance at a point in the future. Rage becomes a basic condition of history. 
Ironically, however, this rationalisation of rage is also a form of domestica-
tion, meaning that while investment increases the potential effectiveness 
of rage, it also leads to a practical deferral from the thymotic impulse of 
the Greeks. This is seen from the two dominant models of ‘rage bank’ in 
the history of Europe. The ‘metaphysical revenge bank’ forms the centre 
of monotheistic religion; and the thymotic revolution of the ‘world bank 
of rage’ embodied in twentieth century Communism. In the first model, 
rage is transformed from an occasional action of the Greek Gods to a con-
stitutive feature of the monotheistic God: that is, a God with the capacity 
to judge and enact revenge accordingly. Revenge is transformed from a 
form of thymotic rage to a complex judicial process. Of course, it follows 
that localised, individual rage is an assault on the divine itself (the believer 
should literally turn the other cheek, and invest the rage). Rage therefore 
develops from the simply revenge of hurt pride to a sophisticated system 
of interest and payback. In the second model, twentieth century commu-
nism, the management of rage is developed into a deadly system of self-
harm. Disparate anxieties, angers and revenge projects are guided and 
united by a ‘superior perspective’, whose demands ‘do not always coincide 
with the rhythms of local actors and actions’ (Sloterdijk, 2010: 62). Both 
models harness rage by deferring it, ultimately endlessly, and ‘totalitarian’ 
is not a hegemonic form of power but rather ‘the retransformation of the 
customer into a slave of the corporation’ (Sloterdijk, 2010: 159). True to 
any monopolised market, when a rage bank is formed the more local or 
individual rage projects are condemned for their wasted expenditures 
without significant returns. 
Today, Sloterdijk argues, despite the fall of the central banks of rage 
(Christianity and Communism), there is no ‘real decrease of available 
quantities of rage among the excluded, ambitious, unsuccessful, and 
vengeful’ (2010: 190). However, today’s rage cannot be treated in the same 
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way. The post-1989 world, which sees the dominance of neoliberal capi-
talism, and with it the End of History (as Fukuyama famously expressed it 
(1992)) we are left with ‘an era without rage collection points of a global 
perspective’ (2010: 183). Whereas the workers’ movements of the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries could invest in narratives which 
linked them across borders and localities, this world lacks any such con-
vincing story.28 The result, for Sloterdijk, is either a return to ‘subcultural 
narratives’ such as ethnicity, or, failing this: 
‘[insofar] as the dissatisfied of postmodernity cannot abreact their affects in 
different locations, the only available option is to escape to their own mir-
ror image, which is provided by mass media as soon as scenes of violence 
attract public interest. […] However, it is in precisely such episodes that 
the medium wins over content.’ (Sloterdijk 2010: 205) 
Rage cannot thus be transformed into pride or hope, as the instruments 
of the mass media are situated within the ‘democratic mission’ of neolib-
eralism. This is why Sloterdijk is correct to account for the rage of protest 
movements through its conception within a wider system of market in-
vestiture: a world where, as Mark Fisher describes, ‘capitalism seamlessly 
occupies the horizons of the thinkable’ (2009: 8). The symbolism of protest 
is consumed as an image-icon: activities of civil disobedience, in many 
cases themselves re-enactments of earlier image-icons,29 are uploaded to 
networked media and circulated through repetitive replaying, tagging 
and trending, all the while providing further audiences for the consumer-
ism at the heart of internet media.  
In this sense, the iconoclastic critique within art practice can easily be-
come empty ‘symbolism’, parading as a political alternative whilst doing 
as little to address the fundamental structuring of rage as it does the po-
litical dominance of the aesthetic. Indeed, such ‘symbolism’ within protest 
and activist art cannot provide a point of investment, precisely because of 
its attachment to the older rage establishments. If the energy underlying 
contemporary rage bears little resemblance to the moral and political rage 
collectives of before, their available investment points continue to treat 
them in the same way. The political formations and ideologies available 
can appear as ‘dysfunctional relics’ in the current neoliberal context: 
‘condemned to struggle with ugly speeches against images of beautiful 
people and tables of solid numbers’ (Sloterdijk 2010: 202). The protest 
movements of the new millennium may look for alternatives from the 
totalitarian systems of the past, but are too often based upon the same 
principle of rage investment. While rage remains a ‘basic force in the eco-
system of affects’ (p.227), this leads more and more to the kind of self-
harming violence exhibited within the riots of Paris in 2005 – what Han 
Magnus Enzenberger describes as ‘molecular civil war’ (Enzenberger 1993, 
cited in Sloterdijk 2010: 210). In this sense, representatives of contempo-
rary rage – the by-now familiar images of protest, riots, terrorism – do not 
necessarily signal some kind of challenge to Fukuyama’s End of History 
thesis. Contra the likes of Badiou and Harvey, such phenomena do not 
simply re-introduce social consciousness, political activism or, indeed, 
‘history’ into the vacuum of the post-ideological cultural malaise. They 
remain post-historical: existing ‘when the rage of those who have been 
excluded connects to the infotainment industry of those who have been 
included, merging into a violent system-theatre of “last men”’ (Sloterdijk 
2010: 41).  
It is entirely possible to argue, of course, that the financial crisis of 2008, 
and the breakdown of the global banking system central to it, provides a 
counterpoint to Sloterdijk’s thesis. One may well argue that the ‘credit 
crunch’ and the subsequent rise of the Occupy protest movements, in 
fact, reintroduced history into the post-historical era. But given the spe-
cifically aesthetic issues that we have raised with the optimism of collec-
tive protest, we should be careful to note where the metaphorical and 
figurative aspect of rage investment remains at work in such civil diso-
bedience. In effect, the cases of anti-capitalist protest (artistic or not) do 
not render Sloterdijk’s argument obsolete, so much as ask the question 
which Sloterdijk himself (at least whilst writing Rage and Time) was un-
able to answer: what alternative is there to rage investment? Furthermore, 
given how much rage collection points depend, as we have seen, upon the 
aesthetic or curated dimension of the public sphere, does at least one pos-
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Art’s Investment in Rage 
We have argued in this paper that there must always be a place for caution 
in claiming any such possibility. In particular, while artistic practices may 
be derided for their mimetic qualities – that they can only repeat, imper-
sonate or parody actual civil disobedience – it is precisely this reflective 
space which is needed within the seductive optimism of twenty-first cen-
tury collectivist protest. This is clearer to see if we understand the art ac-
tivism which privileges the event of confrontation, or context of dissi-
dence (whilst rejecting gallery spaces and the introverted contemplations 
of art), as a form of local rage bank. By promoting an imminent form of 
rage at the expense of contemplative practice, this form of art activism 
economises the channels of protest: it demands an investment in a politi-
cal activity, ‘cashed in’ within visible public space. But such investment 
would seem to produce only two outcomes: either to result in a ‘small 
craftsmanship of rage […] condemned to exhaust itself’ (Sloterdijk 2010: 
63); or, to attach itself to a larger rage bank (such as the ideologies rejuve-
nated in the work of Badiou), which only defers its anger by investing in a 
more global future that will never arrive. In both cases, we can make the 
following, tentative, argument: far from the art gallery sanitising the spirit 
of protest, the ‘real’ protest which supersedes it may well itself be a mis-
placed domestication of rage. Like violence, art without a lobby, a frame-
work, an ideology – in short, that has become symbolic of something – is 
then seen as lacking any real effectiveness. Ironically, this means that in 
turn, the ‘art’ of art activism remains mimetic: a representative expression 
of a wider social discontent, in a Habermasian sense. The very rejoinder 
that is supposed to ensure the effectiveness of socially engaged art – its 
attachment to a cause and commitment to real confrontation and applied 
contexts – can thus end up moving further away from the raw energy of 
discontent and into the self-congratulating excesses of symbolic icono-
philia. However anti-capitalist or symptomatic of a ‘new’ cultural politics, 
activist art may well be reduced to an advertising poster for another rage 
bank.  
But what opportunities are there for an aesthetics of civil disobedience, 
that might move beyond the all-too predictable and inhibiting debates 
over mimicry and effective subversion? In this paper, we have attempted 
to suggest that what is at stake in this question can easily be misplaced. To 
subordinate art to an ‘event’ of confrontation is to ignore the way in 
which such events are themselves aesthetic constructs; and to separate 
performances of vengeance, resentment or protest from the institutions 
of exhibition is to ignore the way in which rage depends upon ‘collection’ 
points for effectiveness. With this in mind, we finish with the following 
suggestion regarding art’s relationship to civil disobedience. 
Artists have, and always will, act as provocateurs. The legacy of modern-
ism within contemporary art is its close affiliation with the mechanisms of 
indignation, and as such, artistic projects can expose cultural relations, 
present grievances, and attempt to incite certain forms of rage – a thy-
motic rage based on pride, rather than a repressed desire for destruction – 
in others. At the same time, we should not be surprised if such projects 
are largely unsuccessful. ‘Provoking discussion’ depends upon mutual 
interlocutors, after all, and if we are to avoid simply forming a ‘local bank’ 
of limited effect – and small artistic projects such as Militant Training 
Camp invariably operate on such scales – we are also limited by the motifs 
available to reach extensive audiences. Voina, for example, may well be 
socially engaged and anarchically resistant to ideological order, but acts 
through the reductive language of shock tactics that can quickly become 
puerile.30 True enough, such acts of civil disobedience reach a wide audi-
ence, but through the base qualities of their work, which often obscure 
any deeper references and meanings behind them.  
But responding to such failure need not be limited to, on the one hand, 
over-emphasising the severely local context of any artistic practice, or, on 
the other, investing in a broader symbolic, and iconophilic – realm. In 
between these two extremes, there remains the possibility for artists to 
accumulate mass-media imagery of rage and violence, and process it 
through the gallery system, in what is not so much a rage bank (indeed, 
there is no promise of returns), but perhaps as more of an archive of rage. 
Embracing the contemplative aspect of artistic exhibition is, of course, the 
dyadic opposite of what much art activism works for. However, appeals 
for art activism to focus more on the context often rest at a call for art to 
simply be more immediate: to emphasise the ‘event’ or ‘performance’ of 
dissidence, from Firat and Kuryel’s desire for ‘tactical confrontation’ to 
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the exhibitions such as Berlin Biennale’s exhibiting of the production of 
art as well as the final piece. While Militant Training Camp remained 
party to this discourse, it also suggested ways of engaging with the under-
side of this: the planning before, rehearsing during, and repetition after of 
such ‘events’. It reminds us that, for all the warnings over artists disengag-
ing from the social when they ignore ‘context’, the nature of a dissident 
‘event’ – whether violent or civil – is constituted by more than simply the 
immediate confrontation or experience. As such, when we read such ap-
peals for a context in which antagonistic disobedience takes place, we 
should not forget that determining this context is not dictated by a politi-
cal sphere separate from art, but is itself a curatorial process – perhaps 
ceded, as Groys argues, to political forces, but nonetheless an aesthetic 
concern – funded as it is by the presentation and arrangement of image-
icons.  
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1 The term ‘art activism’ is not without difficulties: some writers, such as Pablo Helguera 
(2011) prefer the term ‘socially engaged art’; whilst Nicholas Bourriaud famously em-
phasised the participatory aspect of such art in his theory of ‘relational aesthetics’ (2002).  
 
2 As well as – and far more seriously, in terms of consequences – allowing for the circu-
lation of counter-media capable of responding to media blackouts in, for example, Syria 
(see Rich 2011). 
 
3 http://theyesmen.org/  
 
4 http://www.labofii.net/  
 
5 http://www.actupny.org/  
 




8 http://provisionslibrary.com/  
 
9 Even the art journal Frieze – proprietor of the Frieze Art Fair, perhaps one of the largest 
symbols of art’s attachment to laissez-faire free market consumerism – recently dedi-
cated a series of issues to art’s role in changing society. 
 
10 See http://www.lutherblissett.net/  
 
11 http://www.berlinbiennale.de/blog/en/7th-biennale  
 
12 See, for example, Christy Lange’s review at http://blog.frieze.com/art-meet-politics.-
politics-meet-art.-a-preview-of-the-7th-berlin-biennale/  
 
13 By far the most concise and eloquent expression of this malaise can be read in Mark 
Fisher’s Capitalist Realism (2009). 
 
                                                             
14 Unpublished at the time of this paper’s writing, the back cover of Žižek’s The Year of 
Dreaming Dangerously promises that the ‘subterranean work of dissatisfaction is con-
tinuing: rage is accumulating and a new wave of revolts will follow. Why? Because the 
events of 2011 were signs from the future: we should analyze them as limited, distorted 
(sometimes even perverted) fragments of a utopian future which lies dormant in the 
present as its hidden potential.’ 
 
15 In broader representational terms, Badiou shapes these actions within a cultural his-
tory of revolt: while ‘blind, naïve, scattered and lacking a powerful concept or durable 
organisation, it naturally resembles the first working-class insurrections of the nine-
teenth century.’ We therefore, he argues, ‘find ourselves in a time of riots wherein a re-
birth of History, as opposed to the pure and simple repetition of the worst, is signalled 
and takes shape.’ Badiou, A. (2012). The rebirth of history: times of riots and uprisings (G. 
Elliott, Trans.). London: New York: Verso. 
 
16 For example, James Kirchick’s (2012) comment that one Occupy gathering depicted 
‘every 1960s leftist trope: groupthink, organizational incompetence, and the simulta-
neous hostility to legitimate authority while blindly following illegitimate authority that 




17 As Grindon notes (2009), the pacifism of many protest groups is often overlooked in 
official reports or representation in the popular media. 
 
18 Žižek has warned over the tendency for symbols to become too reducible to cultural 
commodity, and thus lose their effectiveness. While the protests of May 1968 were aimed 
at a political change, for example, ‘the “spirit of ‘68” transposed this into a depoliticised 
pseudo-activity (new lifestyles, etc.), the very form of social passivity.’ (2009: 60). This 
seems to us to be a central concern for any kind of ‘aesthetic’ of civil disobedience; how-
ever, Žižek is characteristically quick to pass too hastily over the meaning of such a 
commodification of protest; a meaning which the work of Sloterdijk is particularly use-
ful for unpacking. 
 
19 http://www.99percentfilm.com   
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20 One could also argue, contra Marcuse, that the independence of the artist can, para-
doxically, lead precisely to their subservience to ideology. The Abstract Expressionists, for 
example, could well be argued to have allowed themselves to be controlled, to some 
extent, by dominant institutions (for example, Jackson Pollock’s relationship to Clement 
Greenberg). Abstraction in thought (through submission to a particular cultural ideol-
ogy) became manifested in abstract art. 
 
21 More recently, Christian Salmon has documented the power of narrative to blur 
boundaries between computer simulation and real world imaging in his book Storytell-
ing: Bewitching the Modern Mind (2010). 
 
22 Of course, the association of art and terror is nothing new. Jean Paulhan, in his brilli-
antly irreverent but insightful work of the 1920s The Flowers of Tarbes, describes the 
process of aesthetic production and a constant tension between the (artistic) ‘terrorist’ 
and the ‘rhetorician’ who safeguards culture: the innovative and shocking against the 
systematising and codification of meaning. For both, the enemy is banality and cliché; 
but in the end, Paulhan argues, both sides inevitably collapse into each other, as the re-
sistance to commonplaces inevitably forms a ritualistic cycle of innovation and circu-
lation. Likewise, Peter Sloterdijk notes that the principle of revolution and resistance 
embedded within the shock tactics of modernist art, represented by a ‘use of horror as 
violence against morality’, not only ‘explodes aesthetic and social latency, exposing the 
laws whereby societies and artworks are constructed’, but also produces a correlative 
context: ‘Permanent “revolution” demands permanent horror. It presumes a society that 
continually proves anew to be horrifable and revisable. The art of the new is steeped in 
the thrill of the latest novelty, because it emerges by mimicking terror and in a parallel-
ism with war – often without being able to say whether it is declaring war on the war of 
societies or waging war on its own account. The artist is constantly faced with the deci-
sion of whether to advance as a saver of differences or as a warlord of innovation against 
the public.’ (Sloterdijk 2009: 80). 
 
23 See Fuller (2005). Fuller uses this term to refer to an environment where every occur-
rence is passed through processes of surveillance, recording and re-presentation, collaps-
ing the distinction between simulation and original. 
 
                                                             
24 ‘Community Support’, for example, saw a van being suddenly reversed into the gallery 
space during a public viewing. Participants in the camp, all wearing uniforms and bala-
clavas, jumped out, and were under instruction to beat up Bresolin for five minutes, 
then threw him into the van and drove away. But while the beating was real and per-
formed with gusto, it did not last the full five minutes. Perhaps this signalled sympathy 
from the pre-established camaraderie of the participants in the camp; or perhaps a failure 
of the principle aims at extremist art (in any case, the speed with which the performance 
was executed in fact added to the shock factor; the audience was left baffled by what they 
had just witnessed).  
 






27 As such, Sloterdijk is not suggesting some kind of conspiracy theory at work (that all 
acts of militancy are, wittingly or unwittingly, playing out roles predetermined by higher 
powers). Rather, he is suggesting that what may appear to be a dyadic opposite to the 
mechanisms of law, order and stability is, in fact, very similar. To quote at length: ‘[It] 
does not make any sense to establish a relationship between self-confident hatred and 
concepts such as nihilism – despite their prevalence as popular explanatory models. […] 
Rage that has become reified as hatred is resolute good-will. Initially it appears as a 
pointed attach that brings about an intense local pain. Then it secures an allegedly neces-
sary increase of pain in the world in order to persist in terrible reports and other media 
exaggerations. In light of this perspective, it is the subjective and passionate appearance of 
that which the penalising judiciary wants to embody objectively and without passion. 
Both rest on the axiom according to which the balance of the world after its disruption 
can only be recovered through an increase of pain at the right location.’ (Sloterdijk 2010, 
pp.57-8). 
 
28 This argument places Sloterdijk in direct disagreement with Badiou’s alignment of civil 
disobedience and earlier workers revolt (see above, fn.15). 
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29 One thinks here of examples such as contemporary student sit-ins, aiming to replicate 
those of the 1960s; or Occupy camps imitating the ‘spirit of Woodstock’. The work of 
Jeremy Deller offers a particular exploration of this re-enacting aspect of art’s social prac-
tice; for example in his Battle of Orgreave (2001), a re-enactment, and subsequent docu-
mentation of the re-enactment, of the violent clash between police and striking miners 
in 1984.  
 
30 A full list of Voina’s activities – including recreating hangings in Russian supermarkets, 
painting giant phalluses on bridges, and performing a live public orgy at the State Mu-
seum of Biology on the eve of the Russian elections – can be found at 
http://plucer.livejournal.com/266853.html.  
